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'Id SeTsfoT } COMMITTEE PRINT 



THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTHERN 
AFRICA 






A REPORT 

BY 

Senator Charles H. Percy 

TO THE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 
UNITED STATES SENATE 

ON HIS 

STUDY MISSION TO SOUTHERN AFRICA CONDUCTED 
BETWEEN APRIL 13 AND APRIL 25, 1976 







JUNE 1976 






the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
-287 WASHINGTON : 1976 



COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 
JOHN SPARKMAN, Alabama, Chairman 



MIKE MANSFIELD, Montana 

FRANK CHURCH, Idaho 

STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri 

CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island 

GALE W. McGEE, Wyoming 

GEORGE S. McGOVERN, South Dakota 

HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, Minnesota 

DICK CLARK, Iowa 

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware 



CLIFFORD P. CASE, New Jersey 
JACOB K. JAYITS, New York 
HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania 
JAMES B. PEARSON, Kansas 
CHARLES H. PERCY, Illinois 
ROBERT P. GRIFFIN, Michigan 



Pat M. Holt, Chief of Staff 
Arthur M. Kuhl, Chief Clerk 

(II) 









CONTENTS 



Page 

Letter of transmittal v 

1. Summary 1 

2. Tanzania 5 

3. Zambia 7 

4. Mozambique 9 

5. Namibia 11 

C>. South Africa 13 

7. Botswana 18 

8. Conclusions 19 

Appendix 21 

(in) 



Digitized by the Internet Archive 
in 2013 



http://archive.org/details/unitssoutOOunit 



LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL 

June 24, 1976? 
Hon. John Sparkman, 
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations; 
U.S. Senate, Washington, B.C. 

Dear Mr. Chairman: Enclosed herewith is the report of a study 
mission I made to Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique, Namibia, South 
Africa, and Botswana during the Senate Easter recess, April 13 to 25. 
I sought answers to the following questions: (1) What new or changing 
circumstances warrant major U.S. concern in southern Africa? (2) 
How shall we define the U.S. interest in that region? (3) Does our 
economic stake in South Africa — and in developing Africa — provide 
us with useful political influence? (4) What do the people of southern 
Africa want from us? And, finally, (5) Can we as a Nation deliver an 
effective response? 

I met with President Nyerere of Tanzania, President Kaunda of 
Zambia, President Machel of Mozambique, Vice President Masire of 
Botswana, and Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa, and scores of 
other official and nonofficial residents of these countries. We were 
very hospitably received by each of the host governments, and we 
concluded that there is a substantial reservoir of good will for the 
United States in the whole region. 

I was accompanied by my wife Loraine Percy (at our expense) and 
by Dr. Peter A. Poole of my staff. Except as otherwise noted in the 
report, all three of us took part in each of the meetings. In some 
cases, the timeliness of the meetings caused us to report directly on 
them by State Department cable. In each of the countries visited, we 
received excellent cooperation from the American Ambassador and 
his staff, for which it is a pleasure to acknowledge our deep 
appreciation. We also gratefully acknowledge the assistance of the 
State Department's Bureau of African Affairs. 

I believe that we Americans have much to offer — and much to gain — 
by strengthening our ties with Africa. The rediscovery of this fact — 
the veritable rediscovery of a major continent — is a stimulating ad- 
venture of the mind and spirit. I hope, through this report, to com- 
municate to the committee and to other readers some of the great 
potential that all of us felt during our recent visit. 
Sincerely yours, 

Charles H. Percy, 

U.S. Senator. 

(V) 



THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTHERN AFRICA 



1. Summary 



The United States is rediscovering Africa, after more than a decade 
of relative indifference by senior officials, Congress, the press, and the 
American public. To some people, this reawakening of our country's 
interest in a vast continent — rich in every kind of potential but beset 
also by major problems — seems a meddlesome diversion from our real 
interests as a nation. 

I disagree. I believe, and the Administration believes, that we have 
permanent and substantial interests in Africa. We played a leading role 
in supporting decolonization of the northern half of the continent. We 
have invested some $6 billion in foreign aid and $6 billion in private 
funds in Africa. It is obvious that Africa and North America will 
become more interdependent by the end of this century. It is to be 
regretted that it took a civil war in Angola — and the intervention 
of Soviet advisers and Cuban and South African troops — to reawaken 
us to these facts. 

During the Senate's Easter recess, I made a study tour of southern 
Africa on behalf of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and its 
African Subcommittee. I was accompanied and assisted by Peter A. 
Poole, of my staff and by Mrs. Percy. The main questions to which 
I wanted to find answers were: (1) What new or changing circum- 
stances warrant major U.S. concern in this region? (2) How shall we 
define the U.S. interest in southern Africa? (3) Does our economic 
stake in South Africa — and in developing Africa — provide us with 
useful political influence? (4) What do the people of southern Africa 
want from us? And finally; (5) Can we deliver an effective response? 

The Rhodesia crisis 

All signs point to escalating guerrilla warfare and foreign military 
intervention in Rhodesia— and this could well become a much more 
serious war than the one that recently ended in Angola. This rising 
danger to regional and world peace stems from Ian Smith's refusal to 
agree to a timetable for transition to majority rule proposed by British 
Prime Minister Callaghan — and the collapse of talks between Ian 
Smith and the moderate black Rhodesian leader, Joshua Nkomo. 

While refusing to extend the suffrage to any substantial number of 
black people, Ian Smith appointed four tribal chiefs to his cabinet and 
agreed to consider a government commission report on discrimination. 
If he had taken these steps several years ago, they might have been 
viewed as responsive by many black Rhodesians and by other black 
African leaders. In the present context, they clearly are not. Even 
Xkomo, the most moderate black nationalist leader, described the 
appointment of the four chiefs as no progress at all. He said that 
Rhodesian blacks insist on the right to choose their leaders. Moreover, 

(l) 



African leaders have pointed out that Ian Smith's gestures were 
accompanied by the creation of special courts to try accused terrorists, 
a move that no one viewed as conciliatory. 

The U.S. interest 

Thus, from the standpoint of U.S. interest, the most immediate 
requirement in southern Africa is to encourage rapid progress toward a 
legal constitutional framework, guaranteeing basic political rights and 
social justice to all Rhodesians, black and white. Along with every 
other country concerned in the area (including South Africa), we see 
this as the only alternative to tragic racial violence and foreign military 
intervention. 

The U.S. interest in Namibia is very similar. However, there is at 
least a potentially useful framework for negotiations there in the form 
of a constitutional conference. This urgently needs to be expanded, 
preferably under UN supervision, to include the main political move- 
ments and parties in Namibia. The Republic of South Africa should 
also cease its efforts to carve out separate ethnic homelands in Namibia 
and treat the territory as one country. Moreover, it should agree to a 
public timetable for Namibia's rapid transition to full independence 
under majority rule. 

The leaders of South Africa and developing Africa have begun to 
realize that they must greatly expand their economic links with each 
other in order to attain their basic economic goals. They have no 
other rational alternative. However, better relations between South 
Africa and developing Africa depend on rapid and far-reaching im- 
provement of the situation of black people in the Republic. 

While there has been some lessening of pett} T apartheid (segrega- 
tion) — mainly for economic reasons — the South African Government 
has intensified its pursuit of separate development for each racial or 
ethnic group. Under this extraordinary concept, blacks who com- 
prise nearly 80 percent of the population are forced to become citizens 
of so-called homelands (comparable to our Indian reservations) that 
comprise only 13 percent of the land. To earn a subsistence, most 
blacks must find jobs in the white areas, which include the most de- 
veloped urban and rural two-thirds of South Africa. In these areas, 
black South Africans have virtually no rights as human beings under 
the country's laws. 

U.S. economic role in South Africa 

The United States is one of the major investors in South Africa, 
with over 350 U.S. firms represented there. The book value of U.S. 
private assets (in 1974, the latest figures available) was $1.5 billion, 
or 16 percent of all foreign investment in the country. Estimates of the 
real value of U.S. assets today range up to $5 billion. This level has 
been reached in spite of a total embargo on U.S. military aid and arms 
sales to South Africa, Only limited Export-Import Bank facilities are 
available for trade with South Africa, and direct loans are prohibited. 
(The U.S. Government discourages American firms from investing in 
Namibia and forbids them to invest in Rhodesia.) 

American and other business leaders whom I met in South Africa 
generally acknowledged their responsibility to provide expanded op- 
portunities for black South Africans. The country desperately needs a 
large inflow of foreign investment to recover from the worldwide 



3 

recession and to resume past levels of growth. Economic expansion is 
the only mechanism that can produce greater social justice for the 
black majority. 

Although U.S. firms have been among the more progressive em- 
ployers in South Africa, they can do far better, and they must — be- 
cause the pent-up pressures are highly explosive. For example, no 
black labor unions have yet been recognized as official bargaining 
agents. Blacks have been the main victims of layoffs and dwindling 
opportunities for advancement caused by the recession, which has 
reversed some of their hard-won economic gains. However, low- 
income whites have also been squeezed by inflation, threats of lay- 
offs, and the pressure of the black majority from below. 

Under these circumstances, an embargo on further U.S. invest- 
ment in South Africa or a withdrawal of U.S. assets could, quite 
possibly, produce a violent upheaval. At the very least, a ban on 
investment would aggravate the plight of the black majority without 
offering these people any hope for constructive change. 

Thus, I do not believe the answer lies in negative economic pressure 
on South Africa. I believe that American investment can play a useful 
role in expanding the pie and in seeing that it is more fairly divided. 
However, it would be unrealistic to look on U.S. investment as a means 
of transforming South African society overnight. Rapid social change 
can only come through a drastic change in attitude by the dominant 
white minority, the black majority, or both groups. The end of white 
minority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia may precipitate new attitudes 
in the Republic. 

The best use of our economic influence in Africa is that which 
Secretary Kissinger outlined during his recent tour: stronger pressure 
for positive social change in South Africa, coupled with increased 
public investment to help the developing nations of the continent 
become self-supporting. We have strong incentives to carry out 
such a policy. Africa has large reserves of raw materials on which we 
will increasingly depend. Rising living standards in Africa mean new 
markets for U.S. goods. And, as alread}^ noted, the emerging inter- 
dependence of the states of Southern Africa should offer some incen- 
tives for better race relations within national borders. 

What do the Africans want from us? 

In spite of a decade of so-called benign neglect, we found that black 
and white African leaders believed us capable of playing a construc- 
tive role in their region. In fact, there may be a danger that both 
groups will tend to credit us with powers we do not have. 

Black leaders whom we talked with included President Nyerere of 
Tanzania, President Kaunda of Zambia, President Machel of Mozam- 
bique, Vice President Masire of Botswana and leaders and representa- 
tives of the main liberation movements of Rhodesia and Namibia. All 
of them wanted, first, a clear and unequivocal assurance that we will 
not intervene to save Ian Smith's regime if his policies provoke a major 
war and foreign intervention. Second, some positive indication of U.S. 
moral support (not arms) for the national liberation movements in 
Rhodesia and Namibia. The fact that Secretary Kissinger himself 
provided assurances on these points, in his speech at Lusaka, made the 



73-287— 7( 



words doubly welcome. Previously, too many African leaders had 
seen the U.S. Government as unable to focus on Africa and "ob- 
with Communism." 

VTe talked with white leaders in South Africa and Namibia and with 
the Rhodesian representatives in Capetown. Their requests were not 
completely irreconcilable with those made by the black leaders. 
(Both groups have some sense of the possible range of U.S. positions.) 
First, the white leaders wanted the most realistic assessment we could 
give them of the kinds of pressures America was likely to exert on 
behalf of majority rule. Second, they wanted us to be more conscious 
of their point of view. I think, in fact, we Americans tend to be blinded 
by our own preconceived notions when we look at white-ruled southern 
Africa. The apparent similarity to our own situation (which tends 
to make us passionately pro or con) is often deceiving. Having said 
this, however, I think we have no choice but to forcefully remind the 
white minority in southern Africa that time is not on their side. 

It should not be too surprising that realistic Africans, black and 
white, share some of the same concerns about the future. For example, 
they each made it clear to me that they want "no more Angolas" — 
meaning no more foreign military intervention in Africa. This view 
seems to extend right across the political spectrum in Africa — and I 
was reminded of our own consensus on "no more Vietnams." 

Much of southern Africa has been relatively isolated from contacts 
with the rest of the world. We found that many Africans hunger for 
an end to this isolation. Finally, many people we talked with expi 
the hope that American interest in Africa will cease to be a fluctuating 
affair, depending mainly on our perception of the ''Communist threat." 
They would like us to show a more constant concern for African 
culture, African problems, and African goals. If our sole preoccupation 
is to be great power rivalries, many Africans would find it the lesser 
evil to be ignored. 

Can we deliver? 

Secretan- Kissinger's address at Lusaka responded to many of the 
most deeply felt priorities of the African people. Some aspects of his 
program require Congressional enactment; of these points, some are of 
great importance to Africans and some are not. For example, our 
promised support of states that have closed their borders with Rhodesia 
is valued as a symbol and as a very practical contribution to the survi- 
val of these countries. On the other hand, we were somewhat surprised 
to find that repeal of the Byrd amendment (allowing U.S. chrome 
imports from Rhodesia in violation of U.N. -auctions) is now seen by 
Africans as having less practical than symbolic significance. Rhodesia 
is nearly isolated, economically, and is not recognized diplomatically 
by a single nation. Rhodesia's independence will only be recognized 
a- legal by Great Britain, still regarded as sovereign by most nations, 
when Salisbury complies with the basic standards of social justice 
required by Prime Minister Callaghan. 

We found that American officials in Africa share the view of all 
executive branch agencies and departments in Washington: We can 
readily turn to South Africa as an alternative source of supply for the 
chrome ore and ferrochrome we buy from Rhodesia; so we do not 
need to buv more chrome from Russia if we buv less from Rhodesia. 



5 

Our stockpiles are adequate for several years of conventional war 
needs. Thus, there simply is no strategic argument for ignoring our 
own vote in favor of the U.N. embargo. On the contrary, with the 
end of white minority rule in Rhodesia now in sight, counsels of self- 
interest would seem to point toward compliance with the U.N. 
sanctions. 

We were, of course, repeatedly asked during our trip how hard either 
a Democratic-controlled Congress or a Republican-controlled White 
House may be prepared to work, in an election year, to broaden the 
Nation's understanding of our important foreign policy interests in 
Africa. I answered that I frankly do not see how those who favor an 
enlightened and forward-looking American policy could gain the 
slightest political advantage by avoiding this compelling task. 

We were also questioned by many thoughtful Africans about how 
we view the long-term role of America in the future of their continent. 
I think there is no doubt that our economic relations will become much 
more intensive. Even if this were not so, we are bound, as Secretary 
Kissinger has said, by the cultural heritage of 23 million Americans, 
and by the moral sympathy of over 200 million Americans. In close 
partnership with our European allies, we must respond vigorously to 
the pressing needs of developing Africa — and urge the white South 
Africans to seek a more humane and rational relationship with the 
black majorit}^ among whom they live. In this way, we may help to 
bridge the huge economic, social, and political gap that exists between 
white-ruled South Africa and the developing states on the continent. 

2. Tanzania 

Visiting Dar es Salaam at the outset was important because one of 
my main objectives was to learn how the group of African leaders 
known as the "frontline" Presidents assess the situation in Rhodesia 
and Namibia. These four leaders are: President Nyerere of Tanzania, 
President Kaunda of Zambia, President Machel of Mozambique, and 
President Khama of Botswana. 

At one time, Tanzania, was the main center of liberation movements 
in eastern and southern Africa. Now, the black Rhodesian and Nami- 
bian political leaders are based mainly in Zambia. Guerrilla units 
training for the liberation of Rhodesia are mainly in Mozambique, 
and there are some Namibian guerrilla units based in Angola. We met 
with Col. Hashim Mbita and other leaders of the liaison group estab- 
lished in Dar es Salaam by the Organization of African Unity to chan- 
nel support from the OAU to specific liberation movements. The 
individuals we spoke with indicated that they spend much of their time 
now traveling to the neighboring countries of Zambia, Mozambique, 
and occasionally Rhodesia, where guerrilla operations have been 
gradually increasing in intensity. 

Although the focus of the liberation movements has shifted south, 
President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania remains perhaps the most 
influential leader in all of black Africa. His prestige is enhanced by his 
concept of the Ujamaa (familyhood) village and his extraordinary grasp 
of foreign affairs. Our meeting with President Nyerere took place the 
night of April 16. U.S. Ambassador James Spain attended, as did the 
Tanzanian Foreign Minister. 



6 

President Xyerere stated at the outset his view that South Africa's 
racist policies constitute the main long-term problem in the region. He 
said he thought the United States could play a constructive role in 
helping to resolve this problem. He gave Prime Minister Vorster 
credit, however, for seeking to improve relations with his non white 
neighbors and for having tried to bring about a political solution in 
Rhodesia. But President Xyerere said the rulers of South Africa are 
still not thinking in terms of change in their own country — only of 
defending the existing system. He expressed the hope that America 
could influence them on this subject before it proved too late. If South 
Africa supports Ian Smith's regime, Xyerere predicted, the fighting in 
Rhodesia would go on for a long time. The longer the fighting lasts, 
he said, the less acceptable to South Africa will the resulting govern- 
ment be. 

Turning to the situation in Xamibia, President Xyerere said that if 
South Africa acts now, it can have an independent Xamibia whose 
stability could be influenced by the United Nations. If Pretoria con- 
tinues to resist that outcome, he said, the result will be a "government 
of guns." President Xyerere also urged us to visit Mozambique and 
observe for ourselves that its government is independent and national- 
ist, not controlled by the Soviets or the Chinese. 

I told President Xyerere that the United States was committed to 
the aim of majority rule in southern Africa. I said there was almost no 
sentiment in America in favor of U.S. military intervention in the 
region or U.S. military aid to the liberation movements. I urged that 
Xyerere and his colleagues, the other frontline Presidents, continue 
to explore every possibility for a peaceful settlement. I pointed out that 
the United States respects Tanzania's right to choose its own friends. 
I suggested closer contacts between our newly appointed Ambassador 
to the United Xations, Governor William Scranton, and Tanzania's 
Ambassador Salim (with whom we met briefly during a visit to 
Zanzibar). We discussed the importance of Secretary Kissinger's 
African tour, which would bring him to Tanzania in less than two 
weeks. 

President Xyerere is a man of great intellect, with a warm and 
magnetic personality. Much of his time is spent traveling from village 
to village in remote parts of his country, encouraging local officials 
to improve the standard of living of this sparsely settled, resource- 
poor country. X'yerere's concept of development emphasizes agri- 
cultural production and the creation of village-level services. Even 
this modest and pragmatic approach calls for far more capital invest- 
ment than Tanzania can provide on its own. Foreign aid is therefore 
received from many countries, of which Sweden and Communist 
China have had the greatest political impact. 

The United States has provided about $10 million a year in recent 
years, mainly for various forms of agricultural development. In addi- 
tion, we have provided varying amounts of Public Law 480 food aid. 
I had the occasion to discuss with the Finance Minister several 
bilateral economic issues that have clouded United States-Tanzanian 
relations in the past. Reportedly, some progress was made toward 
resolving these issues as a result of the Secretary's visit. 

United States private investment in Tanzania is concentrated in two 
petroleum supply companies, with a book value of under $5 million. 



Tanzanian leaders have clearly indicated a desire for increased for- 
eign and particularly U.S. investment. However, it would have to 
be concentrated in very specific areas (mainly agriculture) to support 
the country's development plan. This has not so far attracted a great 
deal of U.S. investor interest. Recently, the Government has been 
seeking to promote tourism by developing seaside resort hotels as well 
as the country's magnificent game parks. There may be opportunities 
for cooperative U.S. investment in these areas. 

There are some 1,450 nonofficial Americans resident in Tanzania, 
including a considerable number of Christian missionaries. The official 
American community is composed of about 60 officials, half of them 
AID contract employees. This is not an unduly large American mis- 
sion, considering the size of the U.S. aid program there. We were 
pleased to note the high quality of U.S. personnel assigned to Tan- 
zania and their excellent morale. 

Zanzibar 

The U.S. Consulate on Zanzibar (one of our oldest diplomatic posts 
in the world) is run by two young and able Foreign Service officers, 
David Halsted and Michael Cutter. Zanzibar and Tanganyika formed 
the United Republic of Tanzania in 1963. There is no indication 
today of the communal tension and violence that marked the early 
years of independence. Zanzibar now enjoys tranquility and the rule 
of law. There is a substantial foreign trade surplus and many indica- 
tions of relative prosperity, including new factories, hotels, a Japanese 
amusement park, and much public construction. Although Zanzibar 
has considerable administrative autonomy within Tanzania, the is- 
land's official Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) is in the process of merging 
with President Nyerere's Tanzania Africa National Union (TANU). 

3. Zambia 

On Easter Sunday morning, we met with President Kenneth 
Kaunda in the capital city of Lusaka after attending a service at 
the Anglican Cathedral. This was filled to capacity, and the congre- 
gation was about evenly divided between black and white families, 
with a sprinkling of Asians; there was the usual Easter morning 
enthusiasm from the many children present, some for baptism. 

This setting was appropriate for our meeting with Dr. Kaunda, a 
devout Christian leader. His moral principles have been challenged 
time and again since he led his young nation to independence in 1964. 
Zambia's support of the worldwide economic boycott of Rhodesia 
costs the country some $100 million a year. Dr. Kaunda has clearly 
indicated that he prefers negotiation to war, having met with both 
Prime Minister Vorster and Ian Smith to try to resolve the impasse 
in Rhodesia. However, along with the other frontline presidents 
(Nyerere, Machel, and Khama), he has finally adopted the position 
that Smith's stalling and intransigence has left Rhodesian nationalists 
no other course but to fight for their rights. 

President Kaunda opposed one-party dominance by the Marxist 
MPLA in Angola, and he only decided to recognize President Neto's 
government a few da}s before our visit. During the Easter weekend, 
he was preparing for a state visit to Mozambique, a major event for 
both countries. 



8 

We met with President Kaunda for over an hour at Government 
House. Present during our meeting were Ambassador Jean Wilkowski, 
Foreign Minister Banda, and the President's senior political advisers. 
President Kaunda stressed his hope that all nations would appty 
concerted pressure to bring Ian Smith to the negotiating table. He 
pointed out that Ian Smith had rejected the most persistent efforts by 
the British Government, the four frontline Presidents, and the black 
Rhodesians to reach a political settlement. He urged that the United 
States put aside its "obsession with communism" and join in the 
policy of concerted pressure. In regard to Namibia, Dr. Kaunda 
claimed that Prime Minister Vorster could greatly improve the chances 
of a nonviolent political solution by setting a date now for Namibia's 
independence. 

Dr. Kaunda has a remarkable presence. He is relaxed in spite of 
the conflicting pressures he must bear. Yet one can sense a ver\- human 
impatience. In spite of his many outspoken warnings — to the world in 
general and to the United States in particular — he fears that the 
problems of southern Africa have been largely ignored until now when 
the region is on the brink of disaster. (Excerpts from his speech during 
Secretary Kissinger's visit to Lusaka are included in the Appendix.) 

During our two-day visit to Lusaka, we also met with Bishop 
Muzorewa, who has long been regarded as the most widely supported 
black political leader in Rhodesia. His main theme was that Ian 
Smith's stubborness left black Rhodesians no alternative except 
armed struggle. He also dwelt on the failure of America for the last 
ten years to heed his many warnings of trouble in Rhodesia. He indi- 
cated that repeal of the Byrd amendment would be a symbol of 
America's present support for majority rule. He said that young 
Rhodesians are prepared to sacrifice their lives for freedom and that 
they are gaining confidence as guerrilla fighters; he said they were not 
fighting against a race but against a racist system. Finally when 
asked if a new group of leaders had begun to appear in the gueirilla 
training camps, Muzorewa claimed it was "premature" to make such a 
rient. 

I told Bishop Muzorewa that I believe the American people support 
the aim of majority rule but want to see it come without violence. 
red that a brief and just struggle was more humane than a 
prolonged one with many casualties. 

We also met with four officials of the Institute of Namibia in Lusaka. 
This organization is supported by the United Nations, and its aim is 
to train the future leaders of an independent Namibia. The four able 
young men whom we met had all attended universities in the United 
State-. They were leaders of the Southwest African Peoples Organiza- 
tion (SWAPO), a liberation movement that has widespread interna- 
tional support from nations that span the whole range of ideologi •-. 
These representatives -aid they hoped to carry out the liberation of 
their country without violence, and they indicated their gratitude for 
increasing U.S. sympathy for their position at the United Nations 
and their hope that we would help support the training program of 
amibia Institute. We found them to be politically sophisticated 
and well informed about current events in the United State-. 

rresent, the United States has no economic aid program in 

Zambia. A $6 million U.S. loan was provided in 197/! as a form of 

aid when Zambia closed it^ border with Rhodesia. During his 



9 

visit to Lusaka, Secretary Kissinger stated publicly that the United 
States intends to respond to Zambia's current financial situation. 

The Zambian Government seeks to attract Western private invest- 
ment, and the estimated book value of investments by U.S. firms, 
primarily in minerals extraction, is $114 million. 

The Zambian Government limits to 15 the official complement of 
each foreign embassy. (This practice would surely commend itself 
to many American ambassadors, who so often find their embassies 
cluttered with large numbers of non-State Department personnel.) 
In fact, Embassy Lusaka was understaffed at the time of our visit, 
and everyone was extremely busy with preparations for the Secre- 
tary's visit, which followed ours by only 8 days. We were thus all the 
more grateful for the excellent program they provided for us on an 
Easter weekend. 

4. Mozambique 

Our visit to Mozambique was brief, but it was interesting to see 
firsthand the transition through which this former Portuguese colom r 
is passing. Profound changes have taken place in Mozambique since 
the April 1974 overthrow of the Caetano government in Lisbon — by 
Portuguese Army Reserve officers who had become disillusioned by 
their country's endless colonial wars in Africa. Within months, the 
new Portuguese rulers began the process of decolonization. Agreement 
was reached fairly rapidly in the case of Mozambique and also in 
Guinea Bissau and the Cape Verde Islands. These countries were 
spared some of the more serious military and political problems that 
occurred in Angola. Lisbon recognized FRELIMO (rront for the 
Liberation of Mozambique) as the dominant political force in Mozam- 
bique, and the county achieved full independence in June 1975. 

However, independence has brought a host of problems; these 
have been magnified by the exodus of hundreds of thousands of Portu- 
guese residents, including most of the professional and managerial 
5S. The main reason for their departure was uncertainty about the 
regime's ability to maintain security and to operate the basic 
economic and social services which it controls. By the time of our visit, 
only about 20,000 Portuguese, man}' of them teachers, remained in the 
try; most of these were considered likely to leave on completion 
of their contracts in the summer of 1976. 

A great deal of economic development took place in the capital 
city of Maputo — former Lorenco Marques — during the final decade 
of colonial rule. It is said that the FRELIMO guerrillas were surprised 
when they finally saw the capital after spending years in the jungle. 
Today on first sight, the city seems well cared for and prospe 
Cars jam the avenues at rush hours, there are many well-dressed 
pedestrians, and at night the neon-lit shops and restaurants lend an 
air of normalcy. The gracious Polano Hotel on the Indian Ocean is well 
run and full of newh^-arrived diplomats. However, many are there 
because of the endless bureaucratic obstacles to renting a house. 
Hundreds of homes w ere abandoned by former Portuguese resident- — 
and taken over by the State two months later. Many of them still 
remain vacant. Construction has stopped on high-rise office buildings 
that stand with their scaffoldings, two-thirds complete. The i - 
tribution of food and other essentials is extremely disrupted. Medical 
services have greatly diminished because of the departure of most 



10 

Portuguese doctors and nurses, and long waiting lines are the order of 
the day. 

In spite of the country's economic stagnation, the government has 
recently decided to close its border to Rhodesia, at an estimated cost 
of some $200 million per year. Mozambique's main links with the 
outside world are its fine port and its railway line to South Africa, 
both of which are still being operated with the help of South African 
technicians. 

At the time of our visit, the small Foreign Ministry staff was 
heavily burdened with the task of establishing formal diplomatic tics 
with dozens of nations and preparing for a series of state visits by 
African leaders. President Kaunda arrived on the day of our depar- 
ture; almost the entire government was engaged in preparing for his 
visit. Streets were being lined with flags and banners. At the airport, 
a vast crowd of soldiers, dancers, musicians, uniformed schoolchildren, 
and other spectators waited patiently for the great event. 

During our one-hour meeting with President Machel, we found him 
relaxed and extremely cordial. He spoke to us in Portuguese, through 
an interpreter, and seemed anxious to make himself clearly under- 
stood. He declared that the struggle in Rhodesia is not a racist struggle 
of black against white but a true liberation struggle of an oppressed 
people seeking fundamental human rights and dignity. He said that 
the effort was directed against the illegal regime of Ian Smith and not 
against innocent men, women, and children. 

When I asked him what his government expected from the United 
States, President Machel answered by saying what he felt the United 
States should not do. For example, he said he does not want America 
to try to back one group or leader in the Rhodesian liberation move- 
ment against another. He said the leadership of the movement should 
be left to the black Rhodesians. If it were, he believed that leaders 
would emerge from those engaged in the armed struggle, as he claims 
they did in Mozambique. 

Turning to Angola, President Machel said the only truly nationalist 
political movement in the country was the MPLA (Popular Move- 
ment for the Liberation of Angola). He described the National Front 
for the Liberation of Angola (FXLA) as tribal, regional, and racist 
and said its headquarters were outside Angola. And he claimed that 
UNITA was created by the Portuguese to protect their interests. 
Despite his preference for the MPLA, Machel told us he had supported 
national reconciliation in Angola until South African forces inter- 
vened. With a touch of irony, he pointed out that South Africa's 
intervention led to the rapid victory of the MPLA and its recognition 
by all of Africa as the Government of Angola. Had South Africa 
stayed out of the war, Machel said, it might still be going on, and no 
more than fifteen African States would have recognized the MPLA. 

On U.S. -Mozambique relations, President Machel said he was more 
interested in our current and future policies than in reviewing the 
past. He said he believes that Americans in general want to see south- 
ern Africa free. In what may have been an oblique reference to Soviet 
and Cuban involvement in Africa, he emphasized that Mozambique 
had won its independence without foreign intervention. He said that 
Mozambique is beholden to no one, and will continue to conduct its 
affairs independent of outside influence. (In May, President Machel 



11 

made a long-deferred visit to Moscow, having already made the 
rounds of other Socialist capitals: new economic and military aid 
agreement- were signed by Machel in the U-S.S.R. 

In ray remarks to President Machel. I said that I agreed completely 
that it was not in the interest of any nation to exchange one form of 
dependence for another. I foresaw increased emphasis on Africa in 
U.S. policy, a- -ienified by Secretary Kissinger's forthcoming visit. 

During the Secretary'- African tour. President Machel released two 
American missionaries who had been in prison. This seems to indicate 
that he welcomes the new U.S. interest in southern Africa. However, 
according to press reports, a considerable number of Africans and 
Europeans — including one American — are still being held in prison 
without charges in Mozambique. 

5. Namibia* 

On April 20, we flew to Windhoek, the administrative capital of 
Namibia, via Johannesburg. South Africa has administered Namibia 
since taking control of the territory in Wotld War I. The name 
Namiba was given to the country by the United Nations General 
Assembly in 196^. South Africa ha- refused to recognize a long series of 
United Nations and World Court rulings that it has no right to ad- 
ministei Namibia: most of these rulings have been supported by the 
United St-. 

In spite of Pretoria'> effort- to put its stamp on Namibia, history 
has given the territory and its people a distinctive charactei which is 
difficult to erase. In the case of South Africa. Euiopean settlement 
dates from the 1600'-. and preceded black African settlement. In 
Namibia, on the other hand, there were no important European 
colonies until the Germans arrived in the late ISOO's. The Ovanibc-:- 
and Herrero-. the two largest tribes, emigrated south into Namibia 
several generations earlier. Neither the Germans nor the later South 
African rulers of Namibia did much to promote the welfare of the 
black inhabitants of the country. But it was only after War War II 
that Pretoria began to burden them heavily with apartheid (segrega- 
tion) laws and with the policy of assigning blacks to ethnic "home- 
lands. " Thus, black people, who outnumber white- by almost 9 to 1 
m Namibia (a much higher ratio than in South Africa), seem even 
more inclined to resist these racist policies than South African black-. 

During our visit we were able to encounter a broad spectrum of 
of political opinion. The views expressed to us ranged all the way 
from rigid support of white supremacy to the attitude that the "first 
stage" of majority rule should be a dictatorship. In between these 
extreme position-, we encountered a somewhat encouraging degree 
of political sophistication and flexibility. However, there i- very 
little communication between leaders of the white power structure 
and representatives of the major parties — though many people on 
both side- seem to share the objectives of an early, nonviolent transi- 
tion to independence with some form of majority rule and protection 
of basic rights of all peoples. 

♦South Africans still refer to it as "South West Africa." A more detailed history of 
Namibia and a summary of the South African Governments position are in the Appendix 
to this report. 

7S-2S7— 76 3 



12 

A constitutional conference has been organized by the South African 
Government. If it is to serve as a plausible framework for shaping 
Namibia's future, it urgently needs to be broadened to include the 
main political parties. Of these, SWAPO (South West African Peoples 
Organization) is undoubtedly the most important. However, several 
others also have a substantial following. These include SWANU 
(South West African National Union), which is mainly drawn from 
the Herrero tribe, and the Federal Part}* — membership limited to 
whites, but more moderate than the Nationalist Party. 

At present, membership in the constitutional conference is in effect 
limited to representatives of various ethnic groups. Most of these 
representatives have given little evidence of being independent 
spokesmen of the population; some are illiterate, and most have had 
no previous political experience. Nevertheless, the conference has 
voted to reject some forms of segregation and has adopted the principle 
of equal pay for equal work. 

In April 1976, there were signs that the conference might adopt a 
constitution that had just been presented by Chief Kapuuo, a well- 
educated and respected Herrero leader, with whom we met. He 
described his constitution as providing for a bicameral legislature, 
with one house composed of representatives from the north, where 
the main ethnic ■■homelands" are located, and one from the central 
and southern areas, which contain the large towns and white-run 
farms and mining enterprises. It was assumed that the Ovambo 
tribe, comprising about half the population of roughly one million, 
would control the '-northern house," while the Herrero and more 
urbanized tribes might control the "southern house." Since laws could 
only be enacted by consensus between the two houses, the Ovambos' 
numerical and political strength might be balanced by that of more 
conservative groups in the southern region. 

Such a constitutional arrangement would not conflict with the fore- 
cast of Namibia's future given by Foreign Minister Muller at Stellen- 
bosch University on April 1, 1976. Excerpts from this important 
statement, which coincide closely with remarks that Prime Minister 
Vorster made to me, are included in the Appendix of this report. 

We were able to meet with key officials of the South African 
Government administration in Namibia, including a number of 
black people who have accepted positions of some responsibility in 
the Ovambo ' 'homeland", which I visited on Apiil 21. (According to 
press reports in May, a half-mile section of Ovamboland, bordering 
on Angola, has been evacuated by the South African Government in 
an attempt to counter the increasing terrorism.) We also met a number 
of delegates to the constitutional conference, though it was not in 
session during our visit. 

Most of our contacts with representatives and supporters of the 
various political parties operating inside Namibia were arranged for 
us'bv the American Embassy in Pretoria. In a few instances, individ- 
uals learned of our visit and contacted us on their own initiative — 
and in violation of the apartheid laws. 

\o U.S. officials are stationed in Namibia, and the U.S. Govern- 
ment actively discourages U.S. investment in the territory. In order 
m emphasize the fact that it regards South Africa's presence in 
Namibia as illegal, the U.S. Government has severely restricted travel 
to Namibia of officials of the executive branch. No member of the 



13 

U.S. Senate had heretofore visited Namibia to my knowledge or that 
of the U.S. Embassy in South Africa. The only U.S. official currently 
stationed in South Africa who has regularly visited Namibia is a 
junior officer of the American Embassy in Pretoria, Mr. Richard 
Tierney, who accompanied us on our trip, and whom we found to 
be an extremely knowledgeable and capable FSO. 

The purpose of the U.S. Government's policy of severely limiting 
official contact with Namibia is to avoid de facto recognition of 
South Africa's role in the territory. I believe, however, that the 
United States has only minimized the role that it might have played 
in recent years in helping to encourage a satisfactory political solution 
in Namibia. Thus, I believe this policy of the United States should 
be changed so as to enable us to play a more active role in helping 
to bring about a necessary settlement. 

During our brief visit, I was able to arrange an initial meeting be- 
tween a leading official of the South African Government and an 
influential Protestant minister, who told us that his congregation is 
composed mainly of SWAPO supporters. These men, as I discovered 
from talking with them separately, had more in common than they 
seemed to realize. The administrator wanted to talk with the minister, 
but was reluctant to make the first move. The churchman's first 
reaction was to agree to a meeting only if it were held on "neutral" 
ground and with a witness present. However, after persuading them 
to speak together on the phone, the minister told me that the meeting 
would be held privately in the official's office. Although the episode 
has no great political significance, I felt that it revealed a need for 
some person or institution to help bridge the gap between people on 
both sides in Namibia who should be playing constructive roles in 
shaping the country's future. 

6. South Africa 

In Capetown (April 22-23), we had an opportunity to meet with 
Prime Minister Vorster, senior officials of the Department of Foreign 
Affairs, and leaders of three parties reflecting a cross-section of the 
all-white parliament. These parties are: The Nationalists, who hold 
122 out of 171 seats; the United Party (36 seats), whose views are 
somewhat less conservative on racial matters; and the Progressives 
(12 seats), who might be considered near the middle of our own 
political spectrum. 

We also met with a distinguished group of leaders of Capetown's 
large "colored" (racially mixed) community. These people have been 
disenfranchized because they were viewed by the Afrikaners as 
potential allies of the "English-speaking" whites. (The Afrikaners, 
who form a cohesive majority within the white minority, only gained 
their present dominance after World War II.) Many colored people 
have been forced to move from homes they have occupied for genera- 
tions to make way for white developments. Colored people comprise 
about half of Capetown's one million population. 

We visited South Africa's National Nuclear Research Center at 
Pelindaba. This is also the site of a nuclear enrichment plant, which 
uses a process developed in South Africa. The director of the facility, 
Dr. Aja Roux, said that South Africa is concerned about preserving 



14 

its proprietary right to the enrichment process because of the scarcity 

of other energy sources in the country. 

At the time of our visit, Prime Minister Vorster had just returned 
from an official visit to Israel, which occasioned press speculation 
about a possible armaments agreement between the two countries. 
When we met a few days later, the Prime Minister emphatically 
denied that there had been any such agreement. He said that the only 
understandings his government had reached with Israel were of an 
economic and commercial nature. I raised the subject of the Nuclear 
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and pointed out that many nations would 
be favorably impressed if South Africa signed this treaty. The Prime 
Minister said that the subject would be reviewed intensively b} T his 
government during the coming months. 

Our meeting with Prime Minister Vorster was overshadowed by a 
series of events which he unquestionably finds disturbing. First, the 
victory of the Communist-supported MPLA forces in Angola, in spite 
of military intervention by South Africa, proved that South Africa 
cannot forcibly resist the growing pressures for black political power 
in southern Africa. Second, the U.S. failure to veto a UN resolution on 
Namibia, in March 1976, caused growing concern among white South 
Africans. And third, Secretary Kissinger's omission of South Africa 
from his itinerary — although he announced that he would deal with 
regional problems — caused bitter comment in the South African press. 

The Prime Minister began our conversation by saying he regarded 
South Africa as part of the free world and the United States as his 
leader — although, he added bluntly, he was not always sure where the 
United States stood. I stated that the black African Presidents with 
whom I had met acknowledged Mr. Vorster's role in trjdng to solve 
the Rhodesian problem and reduce tensions between his country and 
theirs. I asked about a press report I had seen that morning which 
said he would not rule out supplying arms to Rhodesia. The Prime 
Minister said this report was inaccurate, and that he had no intention 
of aiding Ian Smith's government militarily. (Senior South African 
officials have since made this point publicly.) However, he added that 
it was against South Africa's policy to take part in an economic 
boycott. 

Turning to Namibia, Mr. Vorster stated, in answer to my question, 
that he had delegated full powers to the constitutional convention to 
decide the future of that territory. I asked if he would permit represen- 
tatives of SWAPO to take part in the conference, and he replied that 
this was entirely up to the delegates at the conference. When I asked 
if I could quote him publicly on this, he said I could — but added that 
I should nlso make it clear that he personally had no use for SWAPO, 
because in his opinion it was "born in sin" and organized "by 
communists." 

I asked if he was prepared to see Namibia become independent at 
an early date, and he said he was if this was the will of the conference. 
He pointed out, however, that the Warvis Bay enclave was indis- 
putably part of South Africa and would remain so. And he implied 
that there might have to be some hard bargaining over various assets 
in the territory, such as railroads, that are owned by South Africa. 

Our meeting with Prime Minister Vorster did nothing to change 
my view that South Africa's racial policies are both irrational and 



15 

immoral in toda}~'s world. However, I was impressed by Mr. Vorster's 
frankness and by his shrewd perception of his country's main foreign 
policy interests. The test of his statesmanship may well be in whether 
he seeks merely to shield South Africa from the winds of social 
change — or whether he uses his many political assets to reorganize 
South African society in ways that will help him continue to lead 
his nation out of semi-isolation. 

No one could possibly comprehend, in such a short stay, the com- 
plexity of South Africa. This beautiful and deeply troubling country 
is twice the size of Texas. But with the help of Ambassador William 
Bowdler and the staff of the American Embassy, we did manage to 
confer with a fascinating cross-section of the population, and we 
listened to viewpoints as varied as one might find in the United States. 

Afrikaners are fond of saying that South Africa and the United 
States have much in common. In a sense this is true. Settlement by 
Europeans of both countries began in the 1600's. The 19th century 
saw major overland migrations. (The Afrikaners trekked north to 
escape from English rule.) Afrikaners and Americans have each had 
something of a love-hate relationship with the British, though the 
Afrikaners gained control of South Africa only after World War II. 
In both countries, whites have shamefully exploited blacks and killed 
or driven out man}' aboriginal inhabitants. And finally, the material 
culture of the two countries is often very similar — though the familiar 
surface hides many deeply-rooted differences. 

If the Afrikaners doubt that their racial policies are resented by 
the black majority, they should listen to the people speak. I taped a 
few of our conversations in Soweto — the enormous "township" of 
1.5 million black people (it is located on the outskirts of Johannesburg, 
where no black people are allowed to live). 1 We drove to Soweto 
with an expert on South African affairs, whom I will call John. I 
learned from him that workers who live in Soweto must spend a 
fifth or more of their wages commuting back and forth to jobs in 
Johannesburg. 

Senator Percy. All we can see for miles are rows of identical small houses. 
What is that large building over there? 

John. That's called the Baragwanath Hospital. It serves the entire township 
of Soweto. 

Senator Percy. Is it staffed b}* whites or blacks? 

John. About eighty percent of the doctors are white, another 10 percent are 
Indian, and the rest are Chinese and colored. 

Senator Percy. No black doctors? 

John. No. 

Senator Percy. Do you consider yourself colored or black? 

John. Officially, I am colored, but 1 feel and consider myself black. 

Senator Percy. How is a person's racial status determined? 

John. It can be very complicated. They consider various physical features, 
and sometimes the}* have to trace your genealogy. 

Senator Percy. We met a group of colored leaders in Capetown, and it seemed 
to me that they were schizophrenic about the matter of race. They're not with 
the whites, but they are not with the blacks either. Their social status seems to 
be considerably higher than the blacks, and they seem reluctant to fight the system 
for that reason. 



1 The worst rioting by South African blacks in many years began in June 1976 in 
Soweto, where black high-school students objected to the required study of the Afrikaans 
language. 



16 

John. I can give some personal insight into this question of the colored. In my 
family, my mother has six brothers and sisters, and they decided many j^ears ago 
that they did not want to become part of the colored group. So they opted to be 
white. At that stage you could, and we therefore are the onty ones — my mother 
and mj' - five brothers and sisters — in my family who are "colored." As a matter 
of fact, the others refused to have any sort of association with us because of their 
present position. 

Senator Percy. And the black and colored people don't associate politically? 

John. A few j^ears ago, I thought that the colored people were ready to move 
much faster toward the black group politically. But now I think we are in a process 
where some of those people are beginning to move back toward this exclusive 
colored thinking, because they do not want to lose the status they have at the 
moment. It is very tragic. In fact, a number of my closest friends live right here in 
Soweto. Yet I cannot enter So weto without getting a permit. We actually are visiting 
Soweto quite illegally today; any non-black who enters Soweto has to have per- 
mission from the local authorities to be here. 

Senator Percy. We are going to visit a school — a high school just for black 
students, isn't it? 

John. Yes, about 825 students. 

At the high school, I spoke with a teacher, who was black and a 
graduate of the Uiiiversit}^ of South Africa. 

Senator Percy. Does the government provide the same facilities for black, 
white, and colored students? 

Teacher. No, not at all the same. According to the Institute of Race Relations, 
the government spends 154 Rand per year (about $175) on each white student, 56 
Rand ($65) on every Indian and colored child, and 23 Rand ($26) on every black 
child. For white children, nearly everything they need is provided — books, recrea- 
tional facilities, etc. For Indians and colored children, the government at least 
makes an effort to provide textbooks. For black children, the government only 
pays the teachers' salaries (and at a much lower rate than white teachers). The 
black students' families must not only pay for their books and all recreational 
facilities, they must even pay for the upkeep of the school — even basic office 
supplies. 

Senator Percy. We have just come from a very large white community, hun- 
dreds of homes, each of which seemed to have a tennis court and swimming pool. 
Do you have a swimming pool here at the school for the students? 

Teacher [laughs]. I'm sure they would regard that as a luxury. 

Senator Percy. Where would they swim if they wanted to swim? 

Teacher. In the whole of Soweto, we have about one and a half million people, 
and there are only two swimming pools for the people. 

Senator Percy. What's your feeling, as a college graduate with a tremendous 
responsibility for these young students, when you see the vast wealth in this 
country that comes from gold mining, diamonds, and from the exploitation of 
cheap labor. What's your feeling about that? 

Teacher. Well, I think the terrible feeling that almost everybody has is 
frustration, bitterness, and rejection of everything that is white. The whites don't 
make any effort to share things with us. They want it all for themselves. 

Senator Percy. What is your feeling about the way things are going in Rhodesia? 

Teacher. Well, I would like to see black majorit}^ rule in Rhodesia. And once 
it comes there, as it must come, I don't see how South Africa can escape that 
alternative. 

Senator Percy. How about Namibia? Have you followed events up there? 

Teacher. I think the constitutional conference is ji st a waste of time. I think 
the sooner the government recognizes that SWAPO represents the aspirations 
of the people, the better for everyone. 

On a hill overlooking Soweto, we stopped to talk with a black 
woman whom I will call Sarah. 

Senator Percy. Would you describe the living conditions in this town? 

Sarah. Well, every single house — I don't know how many thousands there 
are — has exactly the same standard four rooms. The family that is assigned to 
it pays something like a third of their wages for it — this is exhorbitantly high 
considering how little most of them make. 

Senator Percy. Can they own these homes? 

Sarah. No. And out of a million and a half people, I would say just under a 
thousand have been allowed to have long-term leases on the homes they live in. 



17 

Senator Percy. And what is this little park overlooking Soweto used for? 

Sarah, (laughs) This is where they bring the white tourists who want to see 
Soweto. See that tea shop over there? That and the restrooms are for whites 
only! 

Later, I had this conversation with a lady I will call Mrs. Kaba, 
who is married to a doctor. 

Senator Percy. Are you working now yourself? 

Mrs. Kaba. I was a teacher, but I resigned because I disagreed with the idea 
of "Bantu education." The curriculum is designed to make it possible for black 
people to operate only on the lowest rungs of society. I am in pain over this 
inferior type of education designed to enforce an inferior status. Therefore, I 
refuse to participate in it. 

Senator Percy. You've done some work with the elderly, haven't you? What 
does the government do for elderly poor people, and what do you do for them? 

Mrs. Kaba. Our black elderly people get 8 Rand (about $10) every two months. 
With that, they are supposed to pay the rent and clothe and feed themselves. 
There are no old-age homes for black people in what the government calls "white 
areas." Old people are supposed to return to their "homelands" and stay there 
until they die. 

If no one knows the homeland of an individual, he is sent to a "transit camp," 
where he is kept until someone decides which "homeland" is his. The conditions 
in these camps is the most appalling I have ever seen — yet some elderly people 
wait there for up to 3 years while the officials decide where to send them. 

I decided that we must do something for these old people. So we raised money 
(some of it in America), and we started a saving scheme. And we made arrange- 
ments to give them some more nutricious food with the plain porridge they 
receive in the camps. 

Senator Percy. Doesn't it bother you a little bit that this country which is 
richly endowed with a great deal of wealth can't afford to take care of its old 
people or to educate the children — and they're not using the productive resources 
of the black and colored populations fully? 

Mrs. Kaba. This makes me absolute^ bitter. I know that one cannot achieve 
many things in bitterness. But you cannot avoid it when you think that you have 
the ability to work and earn a living like any other human being — but because 
of job reservations, you are not allowed to work. And you are not allowed to 
organize unions where you can bargain. 

Senator Percy. What is your view of the "homelands" system? Do you live 
in the place the government has designated as your homeland? 

Mrs. Kaba. I want to make it very clear that the whole of South Africa is 
my homeland! Any person who thinks I have a homeland somewhere tucked 
away in a corner of South Africa is deceiving himself. Because I believe the whole 
of South Africa is my home and it belongs to me. I am not driving anyone away 
from South Africa, but we must share the whole country. This drawing of ethnic 
"boundaries" is done artificially by the government to keep us separated. They 
want to remain the rulers and not let us come together to bargain for our liberation. 

Senator Percy. Do you have children, Mrs. Kaba? And if so, what is their 
view of the opportunities for young black people in South Africa? 

Mrs. Kaba. My daughter was a law student, but there was a strike at her 
school and she was refused readmission and accused of being one of the ring- 
leaders. Later, she managed to gain admission to the University of the North, 
where she is studying now. My son, who was at the same university, has run 
away from South Africa because of harassment by the police. 

Senator Percy. Where is he living now? 

Mrs. Kaba. He is in Botswana as a refugee. He's nineteen years old, and he has 
only been gone for two weeks, and I have not heard from him yet. 

Senator Percy. Will you write and tell me when you hear from him and how 
he compares life in Botswana with life here in South Africa? 

Mrs. Kaba. I certainly will. I think Botswana has proved a point. We are 
always told we cannot govern ourselves. The independent countries like Botswana 
have shown that we can do it without help from anyone. I have been in Botswana. 
You feel the freedom as you land in the airport, and you feel sad to think how 
little freedom we have in this oppressed country of ours. 

(Note. — All the names of the people I interviewed have been 
changed.) 



18 

7. Botswana 

On April 23, I made a brief visit to Gaborone, the capital of 
Botswana, meeting with Vice President Q.K.J. Masire. The American 
Ambassador, David Bolen, was present at our meeting. 

Botswana gained its independence in 1966, having been a High 
Commission Territory under British protection prior to that time. 
The parliamentary' system of government has served Botswana well 
during its first decade of independence. The country enjoys political 
stability, tranquility, and steady economic growth. Foreign invest- 
ment is encouraged, and a substantial number of white expatriates 
have remained in the country. 

However, Botswana is unfortunately not isolated from the problems 
of its neighbors. It is a land-locked country surrounded by Rhodesia, 
South Africa, Namibia, and Zambia. The railway connecting Bulawayo 
in Rhodesia with Mafeking, South Africa, is one of only two rail lines 
that still link Rhodesia with the outside world. The other connects 
Rhodesia and South Africa directly. The guerrilla war in the southern 
part of Rhodesia has begun to escalate in intensity, and the railroads 
have come under attack. President Khama has been carefulh* coordi- 
nating the policy of his government with Presidents Nyerere and 
Machel, and particularly with President Kaunda, his closest neighbor. 
A substantial number of young nationalists from Namibia have also 
sought refuge in Botswana. 

In our meeting with Vice President Masire, he described Botswana's 
internal policies and the tense political situation in the region. He 
said that Botswana strongly favors an immediate political solution in 
Rhodesia along the lines set forth by Prime Minister Callaghan, of 
Great Britain. I indicated that the United States strongly supports 
majority rule, and he said that his government would welcome any 
efforts by the United States that would help to persuade the Ian Smith 
regime to come to the negotiating table. 

Turning to Namibia, I described my recent impressions of the 
political situation in Windhoek and my conversation with Prime 
Minister Vorster. Of all the frontline states, Botswana probably has 
the most direct interest in achieving an early political solution in 
Namibia because of its long common border with that territory. 
Dr. Masire emphasized the need for South Africa to comply with 
recent U.N. resolutions calling for independence and majority rule in 
Namibia by 1977. 

U.S. private investment in Botswana is so far very limited (book 
value about $1 million). As already noted, the Government of 
Botswana is doing everything possible to attract more foreign invest- 
ment; depending on political developments in the region as a whole, 
this could become an attractive country for U.S. enterprise. U.S. 
economic aid to Botswana averages about $2 million per year, and is 
primarily in the area of agricultural development. If President Khama 
should decide to close his country's border to Rhodesia, as other 
African countries have done, it is likely that he would look to the 
United States and other Western nations for some form of offset aid. 



19 

8. Conclusions 

In southern Africa, I support majority rule and racial justice as 
the only sound basis on which to build stable societies. This is the 
role our democratic heritage requires us to play. And it offers the 
best hope of limiting violence and foreign military intervention in the 
region. 

The most immediate source of instability in southern Africa is the 
escalating guerrilla war in Rhodesia, which has been brought on by 
Ian Smith's persistent refusal to negotiate seriously with the black 
Rhodesians. The United States has committed itself to applying eco- 
nomic sanctions against Rhodesia — and to assisting African govern- 
ments that do so with offset aid — until Ian Smith agrees to a timetable 
for majority rule along the lines proposed by Prime Minister Cal- 
laghan of Great Britain last March. 

Congress has now authorized a $75 million aid package for southern 
Africa, none of which can be used for military operations acro.^s 
international borders. During my trip to Africa, I reaffirmed my own 
commitment to work for the repeal of the Byrd amendment, which 
presently allows American firms to carry on a limited amount of 
trade with Rhodesia. In his speech at Lusaka, Secretary Kissinger did 
the same on behalf of the administration. 

The practical effect of repealing the Byrd amendment would be to 
cut off U.S. imports of chrome ore and ferrochrome from Rhodesia. 
In recent years, the United States has imported annually: 

Only about $1 million worth of chrome ore from Rhodesia (5 
percent of our total chrome ore imports) ; 

Some $2.5 million in low-carbon ferrochrome (15 percent of our 
total imports) ; and 

About $8.4 million worth of high-carbon ferrochrome (46 per- 
cent of our total imports) . 

There is no factual evidence for the argument — often made by sup- 
porters of the Byrd amendment — that halting our very modest chrome 
imports from Rhodesia would cause a corresponding rise in our de- 
pendence on the Soviet Union. Indeed, our imports from the U.S.S.R. 
actually increased after the Byrd amendment took effect. Moreover, 
I was told b}^ South African officials when I visited their country — 
one of the largest chrome producers — that the}^ would gladly make 
up the difference if we halt our chrome imports from Rhodesia. Final^, 
it is worth noting that our chrome stockpiles are several times greater 
than would be needed to sustain us in a conventional war of one year's 
duration. For all of these reasons, there is not a single executive 
department or agenc}^ that claims that repealing the Byrd amendment 
would be contrary to our national interest. 

Ian Smith's regime has said that we are seeking to pacify a radical 
black guerrilla movement by helping them drive out the white Rho- 
desian settlers. This is not our aim. What we seek is a new constitu- 
tional framework that recognizes the rights of the black majority 
without sacrificing the rights of any minority, white or black. We 
realize that it will not be easy to create such a framework. But we 
believe the chances are better if black and white Rhodesians can begin 
to negotiate seriously now, rather than wait until an escalating guer- 
rilla war has moved them even further apart. 



20 

In Namibia, the political situation is somewhat like that in Rho- 
desia, However, there is at least a potentially useful framework for 
negotiations there in the form of a constitutional conference. This 
urgently needs to be expanded to include the main political movements 
and parties in Namibia. The Republic of South Africa should also cease 
it< efforts to carve out separate ethnic "homelands" in Namibia and 
treat the territory as one country. Moreover, it should agree to a 
public timetable for Namibia's rapid transition to full independence 
under majority rule. I have called for a more active U.S. role in pro- 
moting negotiations aimed at full independence for Namibia, and I 
fully support the objectives of Secretary Ki.-singer in meeting face to 
face with Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa. 

The leaders of South Africa and developing Africa have begun to 
realize that they must greatly expand their economic links with each 
other in order to attain their basic economic goals. They have no other 
rational alternative. However, better relations between South Africa 
and predominately black states depend on rapid and far-reaching 
improvement of the situation of black people in the Republic. 

The United States is one of the major investors in South Africa, 
with over 350 U.S. firms represented there. American and other 
business leaders whom I met in South Africa generally acknowledged 
their responsibility to provide expanded opportunities for black South 
Africans. Although U.S. firm- have been among the more progressive 
employers in South Africa, they can do even better, and they must — 
because the pentup pressures as 1 saw them are highly explosive. For 
example, no black labor unions have yet been recognized as official 
bargaining agents. Blacks have been the main victims of layoffs and 
lling opportunities for advancement caused by the recession 
(-till severe in South Africa), which has reversed some of their hard- 
won economic gai] ver, low-income whites have also been 
I y inflation, i in eat- of layoffs, and the pres>ure of the black 
majority from below. 

Under these circumstances, an embargo on further U.S. investment 
in South Africa or a withdrawal of I .8 as some have suggested, 

could prod form of violent upheaval. At the very least, a ban 

on investment would aggravate the plight of the black majority with- 
out offering these people any hope for constructive change. The best 
our economic influence in Africa is that which Secretary Xis<in- 
ger outlined during his recent tour: stronger pressure for positive 
change in South Africa, coupled with increased public invest- 
ment to help the developing nations of the continent become self- 
rting. We have strong incentive- to cany out such a policy. 
Africa ha- large reserves of raw materials on which we will increasingly 
depend. Rising iivii irds in Africa mean new market- for U.S. 

good-. And. as already noted, the emerging interdependence of the 
states of southern Africa should offer some incentives for better race 
relation- within national borders. 



APPENDIX 



1. Excerpts from Speech by President Kenneth Kaunda of 

Zambia, April 27, 1976 23 

2. Excerpts from Speech by Secretary of State Henry A. 

Kissinger, Lusaka, Zambia, April 27, 1976 24 

3. Excerpts from U.S. Department of State publication, 

"Background Notes, Namibia (South West Africa)," 
December, 1974 27 

4. Excerpts from Speech b}^ South African Foreign Mini 

Hilgard Muller, at University of Stellenbosch, April 1, 

1976 30 

5. Text of S. Res. 436 Ordered Reported by the Committee on 

Foreign Relations, United States Senate, May 4, 1976___ 33 



(21) 



1. Excerpts from a Speech Delivered by Dr. Kenneth D. Kaunda, Presi- 
dent of Zambia, at a Luncheon That He Gave in Honor of Secretary 
Henry A. Kissinger, State House, Lusaka, April 27, 1976. 

... In April last year I had the pleasure of meeting President Ford and yourself 
during my visit to Washington D.C. We discussed the burning issue of peace and 
war in our region. Southern Africa was a dynamite whose fuse was getting shorter 
by the minute. An explosion was inevitable. It still is today unless someone 
stops Smith's dangerous mania. 

Today we have a man in our midst whose name is associated with crisis manage- 
ment. It is, therefore, right for me on this occasion to restate that Southern Africa, 
even after the independence of Angola and Mozambique, remains a real threat to 
international peace and security. If you look at the world trouble spots today, 
Southern Africa easily ranks first as a grave threat to world peace. The search for 
a just and permanent solution is a priority of the first order. 

We in Africa stated this very clearly in the Manifesto on Southern Africa in 
1969. We reaffirmed this in 1975 in the Dar-es-Salaam Declaration. Africa, in 
laying down its principles on Southern Africa, gave emphasis to the right of all 
people — black, white and brown to build a future for themselves and their suc- 
ceeding generations on the basis of equalitj r . Africa declared its desire to achieve 
these objectives by peaceful means if this was possible. This was the first option. 
We did not want to kill if this was avoidable. But we also emphasised that if it 
was not possible to achieve majorit} r rule by peaceful means, then the oppressed 
masses in Southern Africa had full right to take up arms to free themselves from 
their oppressors. 

This is exactly what has happened. All avenues to majority rule by peaceful 
means were closed to the people of Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Namibia. 
They took up arms and we supported them. In Angola and Mozambique, nationalist 
forces won resounding victories over colonial forces. 

In the last eighteen months we the four frontline States, namely, Botswana, 
Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia tried to explore the possibility of attaining 
majority rule by peaceful means under the first option in the Manifesto on South- 
ern Africa and the Dar-es-Salaam Declaration. We were genuine and very serious. 
We wanted to avoid bloodshed. I wish to let you know, Mr. Secretary, that we 
walked every inch of the road of peaceful strategy to majority rule; we left no 
stone unturned, until we got to Cape Town and even met Mr. Vorster in the 
process. We believe he was honest on Rhodesia. But even he as the last hope on 
this road failed to achieve majority rule by peaceful means in Zambabwe. So we 
exhausted that option. 

There was therefore only one option left — it was the military option in accord- 
ance with the decisions made by Africa earlier. The British Government rejects 
military intervention, a move which would reduce the cost in life. So that leaves 
guerrilla military action as the only option. Now we together with the six million 
Zimbabweans are no longer walking on the road of peaceful change. Now Zimbab- 
weans are on the war path. We support them as we did before. Just as we left no 
stone unturned on our previous roads, we will leave no stone unturned in the march 
to majority rule by armed struggle. Our commitment to intensified armed struggle 
is as total as that which led us into discussions with Mr. Vorster. The war in Rho- 
desia will not stop until Zimbabwe is born. 

Therefore the answer to ending the war is very simple. Smith and his colleagues 
must hand over power to the majority and then the war will end. This is America's 
challenge now. The longer the war continues the more the prospects of a non- 
racial society in Rhodesia are buried deep in the sands of the past. So those who are 
prolonging the war by rejecting majoritA'" rule are at the same time destroying the 
future of the white man in Rhodesia. Yet this is not [the] Africa's policy. This is 
not the policy of Zimbabweans. The foundations for non-racialism are being de- 
stroyed by Smith. Smith is bent on widening the scope of racial and ideological 
confrontation so that big powers can get involved. America must refuse. Instead 
he must be stopped. If no one else stops him, then the Zimbabweans will push him 
out of their country. 

(23) 



24 

The six million Zimbabweans are not willing agents of the current war. Smith 
invited them to take up arms to liberate themselves. They have done so. The}- are 
merely responding to an invitation. No decent and self-respecting African can re- 
ject this invitation if it is the only way to end oppression and to achieve majority 
rule. 

In Namibia we seek full national independence for the entire territory of 
Namibia. We seek respect for the territorial integrity of the full territory of 
Namibia. We seek the right of SWAPO to take its place as the sole, legitimate 
and authentic representative of the people of Namibia. We seek urgent declara- 
tion by South Africa of an independence date and the acceleration of the process 
towards that date. We are opposed to the Bantustanisation of Namibia. 

Unless these conditions are met, we can expect a protracted war and in that 
struggle, we will remain on the side of justice. The side of justice is the side of 
SWAPO and the struggling masses. They deserve our unqualified support and we 
will give it as we have done in the past. 

The Security Council Resolution in January this year on Namibia is the most 
constructive yet. Its effective implementation would end the war in Namibia. 
The South African Government has claimed that it has no interest in any part of 
Namibia. We must, therefore, call upon them to name the date for independence, 
to organize free elections under international supervision, end repression in any 
shape or form and to free all the political detainees and prisoners. This will end 
the war and turn the armed struggle into a normal democratic political process. 
If we want peace, let us work for peace and not create conditions for armed 
conflict. 

In South Africa itself we continue to seek an end to apartheid. This is an evil 
and inhuman system which the world must continue to condemn and oppose 
until it is destroyed. The continuation of apartheid exacerbates the crisis in South- 
ern Africa for it gives no hope whatsoever to the millions of the oppressed to 
achieve freedom and equality based on justice. Apartheid is a cancer which is 
bound to kill the South African society. It leaves no option for the majority of 
non-whites but to cast their lot with those who are willing to lay down their lives 
in order to be free. . . . 



2. Excerpts From Speech by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger at a 
Luncheon in his Honor Hosted by President Kenneth Kaunda, Lusaka, 
Zambia, April 27, 1976. 

. . . The U.S. position on Rhodesia is clear and unmistakable. As President 
Ford has said, "The United States is totally dedicated to seeing to it that the 
majority becomes the ruling power in Rhodesia." We do not recognize the Rho- 
desian minority regime. The United States voted for, and is committed to, the 
L.N. Security Council resolutions of 1966 and 1968 that imposed mandatory 
economic sanctions against the illegal Rhodosian regime. Earlier this year we 
cospoiwored a Security Council resolution, which was passed unanimously, expand- 
ing mandatory sanctions. And in March of this year we joined with others to 
commend Mozambique for its decision to enforce these sanctions even at great 
economic cost to itself. 

It is the responsibility of all who seek a negotiated solution to make clear to the 
Rhode^i-m minority that the world community is united in its insistence on rapid 
change. It is the responsibility of those in Rhodesia who believe in peace to take 
the stops necessary to avert a great tragedy. 

US. policy for a just and durable Rhodesian solution will therefore rest on ten 
elements: 

First, the United States declares its support in the strongest terms for the 
proposals made by British Prime Minister (James) Callaghan on March 22 of 
ibis year — that independence must lie precded by majority rule which, in turn, 
must be achieved no later than two years following the expeditious conclusion 
<>f negotiations. We consider these proposals a basis for a settlement fair to all the 
people of Rhodesia. We urge that they be accepted. 

>nd, the Salisbury regime must understand that it cannot expect U.S. sup- 
port either in diplomacy or in material help at any stage in its conflict with African 
states or African liberation movements. On the contrary it will face our unrelenting 
opposition until a negotiated settlement is achieved. 

Third, the United States will take steps to fulfill completely its obligation under 
international law to mandatory economic sanctions against Rhodesia. We will 
urge the Congress this year to repeal the Byrd Amendment — which authorizes 



25 

Rhodesian chrome imports to the United States — an act inconsistent with U.N. 
sanctions. In parallel with this effort we will approach other industrial nations 
to insure the strictest and broadest international compliance with sanctions. 

Fourth, to insure that there are no misperceptions on the part of the leaders of 
the minority in Rhodesia, the United States, on the conclusion of my consultations 
in black Africa, will communicate clearly and directly to the Salisbury regime 
our view of the urgency of a rapid negotiated settlement leading to majority rule. 

Fifth, the U.S. Government will carry out its responsibility to inform American 
citizens that we have no official representation in Rhodesia nor any means of 
providing them with assistance or protection. American travelers will be advised 
against entering Rhodesia; Americans resident there will be urged to leave. 

Sixth, as in the case of Zambia a few years ago, steps should be taken — in 
accordance with the recent U.N. Securit}' Council resolution — to assist Mozam- 
bique, whose closing of its borders with Rhodesia to enforce sanctions has imposed 
upon it a great additional economic hardship. In accordance with this U.N. 
resolution, the United States is willing to provide $12.5 million of assistance. 

Seventh, the United States — together with other members of the United Na- 
tions — is ready to help alleviate economic hardship for any countries neighboring 
Rhodesia which decide to enforce sanctions by closing their frontiers. 

Eighth, humanitarian provision must be made for the thousands of refugees 
who have fled in distress from Rhodesia into neighboring countries. The United 
States will consider sympathetically requests for assistance for these refugees by 
the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees or other appropriate international 
organizations. 

Ninth, the world community should give its support to the people in Rhodesia 
as they make the peaceful transition to majority rule and independence and should 
aid a newly independent Zimbabwe. To this end, we are ready to join with other 
interested nations in a program of economic, technical, and educational assistance 
to enable an independent Zimbabwe to achieve the progress and the place in the 
community of nations to which its resources and the talents of all its people 
entitle it. 

Finally, we state our conviction that whites as well as blacks should have a 
secure future and civil rights in a Zimbabwe that has achieved racial justice. A 
constitutional structure should protect minority rights together with establishing 
majority rule. We are prepared to devote some of our assistance programs to this 
objective. 

In carrying out this program we shall consult closely with the Presidents of 
Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia. 

We believe these are important measures. We are openminded with respect to 
additional actions that can help speed a resolution. The United States will consult 
closely with African leaders, especially the four Presidents, and with other 
friends on the Rhodesian problem. For the central fact that I have come here to 
stress is this: The United States is wholly committed to help bring about a rapid, 
just, and African solution to the issue of Rhodesia. 

Namibia 

Rhodesia is the most urgent but by no means the only critical problem in 
southern Africa. The status of Namibia has been a source of contention between 
the world community and South Africa for over three decades. 

The territory of South-West Africa turned into a source of serious international 
discord following World War II. When the United Nations refused to accede to 
South Africa's proposal for annexation of the territory, South Africa declined to 
enter into a trusteeship agreement and since then has refused to recognize the 
United Nations as the legal sovereign. In 1956 the General Assembly terminated 
South Africa's mandate over the territory. In 1971 the International Court of 
Justice concluded that South Africa's occupation of Namibia was illegal and that it 
should withdraw. 

The United States voted for the 1966 General Assembly resolution. We were 
the only major power to argue before the International Court that South African 
occupation was illegal. And in January 1 976 the United States voted in favor of the 
U.N. resolution condemning the occupation of Namibia and calling for South 
Africa to take specific steps toward Namibia's self-determination and independ< snce. 

We are encouraged by the South African Government's evident decision to move 
Namibia toward independence. We are convinced that a solution can be found 
which will embody equal rights for the entire population and at the same time 
protect the interests of all who live and work there. But we are concerned thai 
South Africa has failed to announce a definite timetable for the achievement of 



self-determination, that all the people and all political groupings of Namibia 
have not been allowed to take part in determining the form of government they 
shall one day have, and that South Africa continues to deny the United Nations 
its proper role in establishing a free and independent Namibia. 

Therefore, the United States position is as follows: 

We reiterate our call upon the South African Government to permit all the 
people and groups of Namibia to express their views freely, under U.N. super- 
vision, on the political future and constitutional structure of their country. 

We urge the South African Government to announce a definite timetable 
acceptable to the world community for the achievement of self determination. 

The United States is prepared to work with the international community, and 
especially with African leaders, to determine what further steps would improve 
prospects for a rapid and acceptable transition to Namibian independence. We 
are convinced that the need for progress is urgent. 

Once concrete movement toward self-determination is underway, the United 
States will ease its restrictions on trade and investment in Namibia. We stand 
ready to provide economic and technical assistance to help Namibia take its 
rightful place among the independent nations of the world. 

South Africa 

Apartheid in South Africa remains an issue of great concern to those committed 
to racial justice and human dignity. 

No country, no people can claim perfection in the realm of human rights. We in 
America are aware of our own imperfections. But because we are a free society, 
our problems and our shortcomings are fully aired and made known to the world. 
And we have reason to take pride in our progress in the quest for justice for all 
in our country. The world communitj^'s concern with South Africa is not merely 
that racial discrimination exists there. What is unique is the extent to which 
racial discrimination has been institutionalized, enshrined in law, and made all- 
pervasive. 

No one — including the leaders of black Africa — challenges the right of white 
South Africans to live in their country. They are not colonialists; historically, 
they are an African people. But white South Africans must recognize as well 
that the world will continue to insist that the institutionalized separation of the 
races must end. The United States appeals to South Africa to heed the warning 
signals of the past two years. There is still time to bring about a reconciliation of 
South Africa's peoples for the benefit of all. But there is a limit to that time — a 
limit of far shorter duration than was generally perceived even a few j^ears ago. 

A peaceful end to institutionalized inequality is in the interest of all South 
Africans. The United States will continue to encourage and work for peaceful 
change. Our policy toward South Africa is based upon the premise that within a 
reasonable time we shall see a clear evolution toward equality of opportunity and 
basic human rights for all South Africans. The United States will exercise all its 
efforts in that direction. We urge the Government of South Africa to make that 
premise a reality. 

In the immediate future the Republic of South Africa can show its dedication 
to Africa — and its potential contribution to Africa — by using its influence in 
Salisbury to promote a rapid negotiated settlement for majority rule in Rhodesia. 
This, we are sure, would be viewed positively by the community of nations, as well 
as by the rest of Africa .... 

For Namibia and Zimbabwe training programs should be intensified now so that 
needed manpower will be ready when majority rule is attained. Existing programs 
to train Namibian and Zimbabwean refugees as administrators and technicians 
should be expanded as rapidly as possible. We have requested additional funds 
from Congress for this purpose. We urge other donors and international organiza- 
tions to do more. 

Development for all of southern Africa involves a process of transforming rural 
life. We are prepared to assist in agricultural development, in health programs, 
in manpower training, in improving rural transportation — through both bilateral 
and multilateral programs. 

A revolution in development planning could be achieved by the use of satellites 
to eollect vital information on crops, weather, water resources, land use, and 
mineral exploration. The United States has already shared with developing 
nations information from our earliest Earth resources survey satellites. We are 
now prepared to undertake much larger programs to apply this technology to 
Africa — including training programs and the development of training facilities 
and satellite receiving stations in Africa itself. 



27 

Perhaps the most critical long-term economic need of southern Africa is : a 
modern system of regional transportation. The magnitude of the effort extends 
beyond the capacity of any one nation or group of nations. For this reason the 
United States proposes that the World Bank undertake as a priority matter the 
organization of a multilateral consultative group of donors to develop a modern 
regional transportation system for southern Africa. For our part we promise our 
full cooperation in working out a long-term program and in financing appropriate 
portions of it. 

And finally, I can announce today that we expect to triple our support for 
development programs in southern and central Africa over the next three 
years. . . . 

3. Excerpts From U.S. Department of State Publication, "Background 
Notes, Namibia (South West Africa)," December, 1974, Summarizing 
the History op the Territory and U.S. Policy in Regard to It. 

History 

It is generally assumed that the Bushmen were the earliest inhabitants of the 
region now known as Namibia. Later inhabitants include the Nama and a Negroid 
race known as the Damara, or Berg Dama. The Bantu-speaking Ovambo and 
Herero migrated from the north. The first Europeans to land on the shores of 
the territory were loth century Portuguese seafarers. 

The inhospitable Namib Desert constituted a formidable harrier to any ex- 
plorations into the interior until the late 18th century. During the 19th century 
a succession of travelers, traders, hunters, and missionaries (mostly British and 
Cape Dutch in origin) explored the area. In 1878 the United Kingdom annexed 
Walvis Bay on behalf of Cape Colony, and the area was incorporated into the 
Cape of Good Hope in 1884. In 1883 a German trader claimed the rest of the 
coastal region from the Orange River to the 26th degree latitude after negotiations 
with a local chief. Diplomatic negotiations between the United Kingdom and 
Germany ended in Germany's annexation of the coastal region except for Walvis 
Bay. The following j^ear the United Kingdom recognized the hinterland up to 
the 20th degree longitude as a German sphere of influence. 

German administration effectively ended during World War I when the terri- 
tory was occupied by South African forces. Later Germany ceded rights to all 
its former colonies to the principal Allied and Associated Powers under Article 
119 of the Treaty of Versailles. Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Na- 
tions gave international status to these former colonies. 

Mandate period 

On December 17, 1920, South Africa undertook the administration of South 
West Africa under the terms of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of 
Nations and a mandate agreement confirmed by the League Council. It accepted 
the principle set forth in the covenant that the well-being and development of 
the people formed a sacred trust of civilization. The mandate agreement gave 
South Africa full power of administration and legislation over the territory as an 
integral portion of South Africa and required that South Africa promote to the 
utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the people. 
The agreement contained other safeguards, including provision for reporting to 
the League and for international judicial resolution of disputes. 

When the League of Nations was dissolved in 1946, its supervisory authority 
for the territory was inherited by the newly formed United Nation-. This auti 
Was at least implicitly recognized b\~ South Africa when in 1946 it requested the 
U.N. General Assembly's permission to annex the territory. The Assembly 
rejected South Africa's request on the grounds that the indigenous population 
was not sufficiently advanced to decide its future political status. South Africa 
refused U.N. requests to place the territory under a trusteeship agreement, 
arguing that the United Nations was not an automatic successor to the responsi- 
bilities of the League of Nations. 

In 1950 the United Nations asked the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
for an advisory opinion on the status of South West Africa. The ICJ held that, 
notwithstanding the dissolution of the League of Nations, the international 
status of the territory and South Africa's obligations under the mandate agree- 
ment continued in effect with the General Assembly maintaining the authority 
to exercise international supervision. The ICJ also held that although South 
Africa was not obliged to enter a trusteeship agreement, it could not unilaterally 
modify the international status of the territory. 



28 

During the 1950's various U.N. initiatives failed to resolve the differences be- 
tween the United Nations and South Africa, although the General Assembly 
passed numerous resolutions to the effect that South Africa was obligated to put 
the territory under U.N. trusteeship. 

In 1960 Ethiopia and Liberia took to the ICJ the question of whether South 
Africa was in breach of its obligations under the U.N. mandate and covenant by 
failing to report to the United Nations and by other conduct respecting the sacred 
trust. In 1962 the ICJ decided that it had jurisdiction by virtue of the U.N. 
mandate's provision for judicial resolution of disputes. In 1966, however, on com- 
pletion of the argument on the merits, the ICJ held that it could not decide the 
matter because Ethiopia and Liberia lacked the requisite legal interest entitling 
them to such a determination. In the U.S. view the 1966 judgment did not di- 
minish the validity of the ICJ's earlier advisory opinions affirming South West 
Africa's international status and the U.N.'s supervisory authority. 

On October 27, 1966, the U.N. General Assembly decided in resolution 2145 
(XXI), which the United States supported, that South Africa's mandate was 
terminated and that the territory henceforth would come under the direct re- 
sponsibility of the United Nations. The basis for the Assemblj-'s decision was its 
conclusion that South Africa had failed to fulfill its obligations under the mandate 
agreement and had, in effect, disavowed that mandate. 

Recent developments 

The period since 1966 has been one of increasingly sharp division between the 
positions of the United Nations and South Africa. The South African Government 
disregarded U.N. Resolution 2145 asserting that the United Nations had no right 
to terminate unilaterally its authority to administer South West Africa. The U.N. 
( reneral Assembly established a Council for South West Africa in 1967 to take over 
the administration of the territory. The United States abstained on the resolution 
establishing the Council on the grounds that the terms of reference of the Council 
were unworkable in view r of South Africa's refusal to remove its administration 
from the territory. The United States also declined to serve on the 11-member 
Council (increased to 18 members in 1972). In subsequent resolutions the U.N. 
( reneral Assembly called for South Africa's immediate withdrawal from South 
West Africa and in 1968 renamed the territory Namibia after the Namib Desert. 

That same year the matter of South Africa's mandate over Namibia was first 
taken to the U.N. Security Council which, in successive resolutions supported 
General Assembly Resolution 2145 and called for South Africa's withdrawal from 
Namibia. In particular, the Security Council in Resolution 276 (1970), which the 
United States supported, declared that South Africa's presence in Namibia is il- 
legal since the passage of General Assembly Resolution 2145. Security Council 
Resolution 276 also called on states to deal with South Africa in ways consistent 
with the illegality of its presence and acts in the territory and established an ad hoc 
Subcommittee of the Council for Namibia to study and recommend ways of ef- 
fectively implementing the Security Council's resolutions. 

On July 20, 1970, the Security Council, on the recommendation of its subcom- 
mittee, adopted Resolutions 283 and 284. The first called on states to act in ways 
consistent with the illegality of South Africa's presence and administration, in- 
cluding taking steps to discourage foreign investment in Namibia. The second re- 
ferred to the 1 ICJ for an advisory opinion the question of the legal consequences of 
South Africa's continued presence in Namibia, notwithstanding Security Council 
Resolution 276. 

In the proceedings before the ICJ the United States submitted written and oral 
statements setting forth the legal considerations underlying its view that South 
Africa's rights in Namibia had terminated with certain legal consequences for South 
Africa. On June 21, 1971, the ICJ rendered its advisory opinion, stating its con- 
clusions in the following terms: 

"133 ... (1) that, the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia being 
illegal, South Africa is under obligation to withdraw its administration from 
Namibia immediately and thus put an end to its occupation of the Territory; 

"(2) that States Members of the United Nations are under obligation to 
recognize the illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia and the invalidity 
of its acts on behalf of or concerning Namibia, and to refrain from any acts and 
in particular any dealings with the Government of South Africa implying recogni- 
tion of the legality of, or lending support or assistance to, such presence and 
administration; 



29 

"(3) that it is incumbent upon States which are not Members of the United 
Nations to give assistance, within the scope of subparagraph (2) above, in the 
action which has been taken by the United Nations with regard to Namibia." 

By Security Council Resolution 301 (1971) the Security Council endorsed 
these conclusions, which had also been accepted by the United States. South 
Africa refused to accept this ICJ advisory opinion just as it had disregarded 
earlier General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. 

On February 4, 1972, the Security Council passed two further resolutions. 
Resolution 309 invited the Secretary General to initiate contacts with all parties 
concerned with a view to establishing the necessary conditions to enable the 
people of Namibia to exercise their right to self-determination and independence. 
Resolution 310 called on all states to insure that their nations and corporations 
operating in Namibia conform their hiring policies to the basic provisions of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The United States voted for both 
resolutions. 

As requested by Resolution 309 the Secretary General visited South Africa 
and Namibia in March 1972 and held discussions with South African Government 
officials and representatives of various groups and parties in Namibia. The 
Secretary General's personal representative, Dr. Escher of Switzerland, made a 
more extended visit to South Africa and Namibia during October-November 
1972 for further discussions. Meetings between the Secretary General and South 
African Government officials were also held during the period December 1972- 
April 1973. These discussions were productive to the extent of eliciting South 
African Government policy statements on Namibia's future. The South African 
Fdreign Minister stated that his government: (a) would fully respect the wishes 
of the whole population regarding future constitutional organization of South 
West Africa and would impose no constitutional system; (b) would permit 
all political parties to participate fully and freely in the process leading to self- 
determination and independence; (c) would not delay the act of self-determination 
and would cooperate with the Secretary General and consult with the people to 
determine measures to insure the achievement of self-determination; (d) did not 
envisage individual population groups becoming suddenly independent as separate 
entities; and (e) anticipated that it might not take longer than 10 years for the 
population to be ready to exercise its right to self-determination. 

The Secretary General, however, concluded that these statements did not 
provide the complete and unequivocal clarification of South Africa's policy re- 
garding self-determination and independence for Namibia required by the Secu- 
rity Council. On the basis of the Secretary General's report and a wave of South 
African-instigated repression in Namibia later in the year, the Security Council 
in December 1973 formally terminated the Secretary General's mandate under 
Resolution 309. 

Frustrated by the lack of progress in implementing U.N. decisions regarding 
Namibia, opponents of South African rule held political rallies and demonstra- 
tions, mainly in Ovamboland and in the Windhoek area. Many oppositionists 
were detained for long periods, some imprisoned and some publicly flogged by 
tribal authorities in Ovamboland. During the period June-October 1974 an esti- 
mated 3,000 persons, mainly young, educated Ovambos, fled Namibia because 
of repressive political conditions in Ovamboland and rumors of educational 
opportunities in Zambia. On September 23, 1974, the ruling National Party of 
South West Africa decided that the various "population groups" (i.e. white, 
colored, and black tribal groups) should select leaders who would come together 
to discuss Namibia's future pattern of constitutional development. The South 
African Ambassador to the U.N. stated in October that the people of Namibia 
may be ready to exercise their right to self-determination "considerably sooner" 
than the 10-year prediction made by the Foreign Minister in 1973. . . . 

United States- Namibia relations 

In keeping with its support of U.N. resolutions and International Court of 
Justice advisory opinions regarding Namibia, the U.S. Government believes that 
the South African Government should promptly comply with applicable U.N. 
resolutions by ending its illegal administration of Namibia and recognizing the 
authority of the United Nations over the territory. It advocates a resolution of 
the Namibian problem by peaceful means and supports practical efforts to enable 
the people of Namibia to exercise their right to self-determination and 
•independence. 



30 

The U.S. Government seeks to promote and protect the human rights of the 
Namibian people. It follows developments in the territory closely and expresses 
to the South African Government its deep concern over South African violations 
of the rights and well-being of the people. 

Since May 1970 the U.S. Government has officially discouraged American 
investment in Namibia. It has announced that investment rights acquired through 
the South African Government following the termination of the mandate in 1966 
will not be protected against the claims of a future lawful government in the 
territory. Export-Import Bank guarantees and other facilities are not available 
for trade with Namibia. In support of U.N. Security Council Resolution 310 
(1972), U.S. firms doing business in the territory have been urged to seek to 
conform their employment practices to the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. 

The United States maintains no permanent diplomatic or consular representa- 
tion in Namibia. American Embassy officials stationed in South Africa make 
short periodic visits to the territory to inquire into the well-being of the people 
and to observe political, economic, social, and legal developments. 

In view of South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia, the United States has 
provided no economic assistance to the territory and does not have Peace Corps 
or U.S. Information Service (USIS) programs there. However, in 1974 the United 
States contributed $50,000 to the U.N. Fund for Namibia. . . . 



4. Excerpts From a Speech by the South African Foreign Minister, Dr. 

HlLGARD MULLER, AT THE UNIVERSITY OF StELLENBOSCH, APRIL 1. 1976, 

Containing a Detailed Statement of the South African Government's 
Policy in Regard to Namibia (South West Africa). 

. . . Nobody can deny that South Africa and South West Africa have close ties 
in many fields. In this close association, whieh has developed over maiw decades, 
the South African Railways, Harbours, Airways, Posts and Telecommunications 
and the provision of technical and scientific expertise have all played a notable 
part. In these areas, South West Africa and its people can depend upon South 
African support and co-operation to resolve their particular problems in the 
most effective manner, and this will continue into the future. 

I would like to state clearly and emphatically that South Africa receives no 
financial or economic gain whatever from its presence in South West Africa, 
nor does it intend to reap any such gain from the Territory in the future. As far 
as the present situation is concerned, I would point out that ever}' cent of tax 
on income derived in the Territory, including returns on external investments 
and undertakings, is re-invested in the Territory for the benefit of all its inhabit- 
ants. In this connection it is pertinent to mention that the South African tax- 
pavers have in past years contributed considerably to the administration and 
the advancement of the Territory. South Africa realizes that its resources are 
not inexhaustible and that it bears a great responsibility towards its own people 
who are also experiencing a growing need for development funds. In spite of this, 
the Government makes this contribution to South West Africa's development 
in the sincere belief that it is our duty to do so. It is South Africa's earnest wish 
to reinforce still further the links which it has forged with this neighbouring 
territory not only to the advantage of the South West African people, but also 
in the interests of all the States of Southern Africa which have so much in com- 
mon. The accusations of economic imperialism leveled against South Africa are 
completely untenable in the light of these facts and of the real state of affairs. 
South Africa's record since 1920 shows the very antithesis of economic 
imperialism. . . . 

South Africa respects the right of self-determination of the South West African 
peoples. There can be no interference with that right, either now or in the future. 
Therefore South Africa offers them the opportunity to acquire the necessary 
experience in self-government, so that they will be better able to decide what is in 
their best interests and in what political direction they would like South West 
Africa to move. As they move towards the moment of decision, all options are 
open to them. . . . 

. . . South Africa's only desire in this regard — a desire which should be shared 
by all those who really have the Territory's interests at heart — is that the in- 
habitants should reach unanimity about their political future freel}-, voluntarily, 
and as quickly as possible. 



31 

This is the chief requirement of the Government. It is not for us to decide what 
the end product should look like. Although my theme this evening is the future of 
South West Africa, I do not propose to yield to the temptation to speculate about 
the possible form and content of such a constitutional solution. Suffice it for me to 
emphasize that it is South Africa's firm intention to continue in the meantime the 
work of development in which we are engaged. We shall also continue to protect 
the northern frontier of the Terrritory, and to maintain law and order so as to 
provide the leaders of South West Africa's population groups with the opportunity 
to fulfill their task in a peaceful atmosphere in which with a sense of purpose and 
mutual understanding and trust they can work together to determine the political 
future of their fatherland. South Africa considers it to be of vital importance for 
the people of South West Africa that the solutions to their problems should be 
sought in their own ranks without any form of disruption, whatever it may be. 

The process, which will eventually lead to the new political dispensation for 
South West Africa, is already seven months in train. The Constitutional Con- 
ference in Windhoek had to surmount many obstacles before it could be convened 
last September. All the leaders, white as well as non-white, who took the initiative 
and carried out the work of preparation deserve the highest praise and gratitude. 
Many observers, especially the critics overseas, were originally highly sceptical 
about the Conference. Xow, after the representatives of the different population 
groups have completed three sessions; after four committees of the Conference 
have made intensive studies of economic and social questions and have prepared 
reports on these; after these reports have already been accepted by the Con- 
ference — now we find that some of these critics are no longer so ready to write off 
the Conference in summary fashion. On the contrary, more and more of them are 
now even prepared to give the representatives a chance to determine for them- 
selves the constitutional future of their own country. Thus Mr. Schaufele, the 
American Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, acknowledged on the 
19th of March that the Conference was a positive step, although he added that 
its progress was too slow and that in his opinion it was not representative of the 
people of South West Africa. 

It is self-evident that this exercise in shaping the future cannot proceed too 
fast. The Constitutional Conference recognised the importance of this considera- 
tion during its first session in September 1975 when it drew up a Declaration of 
Intent. Mr. Mudge has no doubt already given you full information in this regard. 

When the Constitutional Conference has achieved its objective of drafting a 
constitution for South West Africa, it stands to reason that this document, 
representing the unanimous views of the delegates in the Turnhalle in Windhoek 
will clearly have to be submitted to the inhabitants of the Territory. How exactly 
thjs will be done, and what procedure will be followed to give the inhabitants of 
South West Africa the opportunity to express their approval or disapproval has 
still to be decided. Because the representatives are continually in touch with 
their people and are keeping them informed about progress in the Conference, 
the various population groups will to a large extent be conversant with the 
constitutional proposals of the Conference when these reach finali* 

In the process of finding a >. and acceptable solution for South West 

Africa'- political future, there is nothing to prevent anyone from submitting 
constitutional proposals in a peaceable manner and from maintaining majority 
support for such proposals. The only requirement — and it is not a requirement 
laid down by South Africa alone, but' one which has also been pertinently put and 
insisted upon by" the South West African people themselves — is that constitu- 
tional and political development in the Territory must take place in a peaceful 
manner. . . . 

No country can afford a bloodletting. The Territory has seen the shedding of 
blood in former years. Why must it happen again? The people of South Y\ est 
Africa are now firmly resolved to determine their future in a peaceful manner. 
The achievement of T :.:~ ] n is< \ rthy objective to go forward to independence by 
way of peaceful evolution, stands in stark contrast to the bloody civil war and 
chaos which we have witnessed in Angola recently. South Africa cannot and will 
not permit such a situation to develop in South West Africa and it calls upon the 
internatii mal c immu rive also to ensure that such tragic events should not 

be repeated in - r Africa. 

As I have already said, I do not wish to speculate about the form of the f - 
constitution of - Id be interpreted as an attempt to 

interfere with or to influence the Conference, and that would be in conflict with 
the Government's policy. 



32 

However, there is a matter about which I would like to leave some thoughts 
in your minds, and that is the particular framework within which the States of 
Southern Africa find themselves, and this applies also to South West Africa bj^ 
reason of its geographical situation and other realities. Among the majority of 
States of the sub-continent there exists a very real necessity — as a consequence 
of their position, bound together by geography and destiny — to work together 
in association so as to ensure the development and the prosperity of the region 
as a whole. Where co-operation already takes place care is taken, not only that 
shared problems should be discussed and thus more effectively overcome, but 
also that the opportunity be offered to all concerned to do so with a better and a 
deeper understanding of each other. Since South West Africa will take its place 
in this group of States, it must be accepted that the Territory will make its 
contribution to the fulfillment of the common aspirations of those States — and I 
trust that it will feel called upon to do so. 

In this context, I would refer you to the existing customs union and the monetary 
agreement between South Africa and some of its neighbor States, and the possi- 
bilities which this type of arrangement holds for other countries. Other spheres 
in which the States of Southern Africa constantly support one another and where 
liaison is continually taking place, are energy supplies, employment opportunities, 
harbour facilities, and rail, road, and air transport. Apart from this economic 
co-operation, there is also substantial regional co-operation in the technical 
and scientific field, which covers a particularly wide range. By this means the 
necessary infrastructure of these States is built up and expanded. Attention is 
being given, for example, to tourism where the Regional Tourism Council 
(SARTOC) makes a valuable contribution to the development of an industry 
which is of great importance to each of the Member States, because each of them 
has a considerable potential which can be developed and expanded. Then there 
is also the Southern African Regional Commission for the Conservation and 
utilisation of the soil (SARCCUS). This regional organisation is of incalculable 
value for its members. The organisation's activities cover a particularly wide 
field of which the control and elimination of erosion, and the conservation, pro- 
tection, improvement and productive use of the soil are the most important 
aspects. 

It is unthinkable that an independent South West Africa would not associate 
itself with the States of Southern Africa, to which it is linked geographically and 
in other ways, and co-operate in these various fields as well as in other fields of 
activity. By doing so, when the opportunity arises, South West Africa will ensure 
that the country and the people will share in the advantages which flow from 
working together on a regional basis. 

I am convinced that an independent South West Africa — just like other States 
in Southern Africa — will be realistic in its conduct and will choose the road which 
will lead to the prosperity of its people as well as that of the entire region. In this 
way the ranks of the independent States will be augmented — the Transkei and 
other Homelands will, I hope, also be added in due course. I believe that this will 
develop into a bloc in which the members will complement and support one 
another in different spheres so that the advantages flowing from this association 
will operate for each State separately and for the region as a whole, thus providing 
an incentive for yet closer co-operation. By vigorous economic and other collab- 
oration and progress, which can lead to the establishment of a constellation of 
States in Southern Africa, political stability can be assured in the whole sub- 
continent. It is hardly conceivable that South West Africa would wish or be able 
to remain out of the customs union, the monetary agreement, and our transport 
network, including the harbours. 

After all that I and other speakers have said about South West Africa during 
this Autumn School, the question may be justifiably put to me: when will the 
peoples of South West Africa attain full self-determination? Cannot a date be 



given 



This too is a matter which in the final analysis depends upon those peoples 
themselves, and especially on their representative at the Constitutional Con- 
ference. It goes without saying that the Government will continue to do all in its 
power to encourage the members of the Convention to reach agreement on their 
political future in as short a time as possible. But, however earnestly we wish to 
<(•(• an early solution, it is not for South Africa nor for the United Nations, nor 
for any other outsider to decide at what pace their deliberations should move. 

Nevertheless, I would point out that the progress already made in this regard is 
encouraging and substantial. . . . 



33 

I have already mentioned that on 12 September of last year the Conference 
expressed its intention of drafting a constitution for South West Africa as soon as 
it could and, if possible, within three years — that is to say two and a half years 
from now. 

The quicker they can do this, the better it will be for all involved. And as soon 
as they come up with a constitution acceptable to all concerned, the Government, 
for its part, will not delay matters or stand in their way. On the contrary, together 
with them it will immediately proceed to the practical implementation of their 
wishes. . . . 



5. Text of S. Res. 436, U.S. Policy Toward Africa, Supporting the Africa 
Policy Statement by Secretary Kissinger at Lusaka, April 27, 1976. 
The Resolution was Introduced by Senator Percy and Cosponsored by 
Senators Clark, Case, Javits, Scott (of Pennsylvania), McGee, Pear- 
son, Pell, Mc Govern, Hathaway, Kennedy, Tunney, Biden, and Brooke. 
It Was Ordered Reported Without Objection by the Committee on- 
Foreign Relations on May 4, 1976 

Whereas Secretary Kissinger's speech in Lusaka, Zambia, April 27, 1976, 
signals a new realism in United States policy toward Africa ; 

Whereas the Secretarj-'s speech takes account of the strong desire of Africans — 
and Americans — across the political spectrum that there be "no more Angolas", 
meaning no more East- West confrontation in Africa; 

Whereas the Secretary has morally committed the United States to a number of 
positive actions aimed at bringing about majority rule — with protection of the 
rights of all peoples — in Rhodesia and Namibia; 

Whereas the Senate shares the Secretan-'s concern that refusal by the Ian 
Smith regime to negotiate sincerely could open the way for outside intervention 
in Rhodesia with greater violence and bloodshed; and 

Whereas the Senate supports the Secretary's conclusion that the best policy 
for the United States is to demonstrate constructive United States support of 
majority rule: Now, therefore, be it 

Resolved, that the Senate strongly supports the basic principles and positions 
which Secretary Henry Kissinger expounded in his address at Lusaka, Zambia, 
on April 27, 1976, and is prepared to work closely with the Secretary in implement- 
ing this new policy toward Africa. 

o 



UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 

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